Multibidding Game under Uncertainty by Róbert F. Veszteg
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Universidad de Navarra
Working Paper nº 14/04
Multibidding Game under Uncertainty
Róbert F. Veszteg
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Universidad de Navarra1




JEL No. C72, D44, D74, D82
ABSTRACT
This paper considers situations in which a set of agents has to
decide  whether  to  carry  out  a  given  public  project  or  its
alternative when agents hold private information. I propose the
use of the individually-rational and budget-balanced multibidding
mechanism  according  to  which  the  game  to  be  played  by
participants has only one stage and simple rules as defined by
Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) under complete information.
It  can  be  applied  in  a  wide  range  of  situations,  and  its
symmetric  Bayes-Nash  equilibria  deliver  ex  post  efficient
outcomes  if  the  number  of  players  is  two  -  for  any  underlying
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The presence of external eﬀects and/or public goods in an economy makes market mech-
anisms unreliable for allocating resources eﬃciently. Ineﬃciency appears in the form of
unexploited gains that can be eliminated by side payments and rearrangements in the
distribution of goods. However, it is usually unclear which mechanism to use for imple-
menting the suggested improvements. In the present paper, I study situations in which
externalities and/or public goods exist and the members of the society hold important
private information related to the problem that is undisclosed to the others. I propose
a concrete mechanism for the family of problems and argue that with it, under some
conditions, eﬃciency as social goal can be achieved. Let us ﬁrst see an example of the
type of situations that form this family.
Imagine that a noxious recycling center has to be built according to some political
plans. The feasibility studies have already identiﬁed two potential areas that are suitable
for hosting the site. The decision to be made by the government is to choose between
these two areas (projects) trying to take into account its implications on social welfare.
In particular, the government’s goal is to locate the recycling center where its aggregate
positive(/negative) impact is the highest(/lowest). Supposing that parties hold private
information (private valuations) on the eﬀects of the recycling center, it is in the best
interest of the authority to ﬁnd out as much as possible about individual private valua-
tions. In order to do so, it can force the aﬀected parties to take part in a procedure or
mechanism that may make reduce the informational asymmetries.
As for the impact of the site on its surroundings, one can consider the following two
scenarios: In the ﬁrst, the recycling center only aﬀects people in its immediate area, i.e. in
the settlement that is located closest to it. This reduces the number of interested parties
in the problem to two (plus the central government whose unique objective is to reach a
socially eﬃcient decision) and causes positive or negatives changes in the welfare of at most
two parties. In the second scenario, the recycling center not only aﬀects the population
in its host town, but a larger set of people at the same time as it might inﬂuence social
welfare across state and country borders. Because of the diﬀerent nature of the problem,
the cases in which there are two and more than two parties will be discussed separately.
Problems of the type described above have already been analyzed in the literature.
Under complete information, when parties have precise information on how the others
value the projects, the multibidding game proposed and studied by Pérez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2002) can be used eﬃciently. Without formal deﬁnitions, in cases of choices
between two projects this mechanism operates as follows:
• Strategies: each participant (each of the aﬀected parties) announces two bids, one
1for each of the available projects such that these bids sum up to zero.
• Outcomes: the planner sums the bids for every project and chooses the project with
the highest aggregate bid as the winner. In case of a tie, some device is used to
choose the winner among the projects with the highest aggregate bid. The winning
project is carried out, the bids related to it are paid and the surplus (the aggregated
bid) is shared among all the agents in equal parts.
Note that the mechanism has a unique (bidding) stage and each agent is asked to bid
for all the available projects. Besides each agent is forced to pay her bid given for the
project that has been chosen winner. Since the revenue raised by the bidding is given
back entirely to participants in equal shares, the multibidding game is budget-balanced.
In the complete-information setting, Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) showed that in
every Nash equilibrium of the bidding, the winning project is eﬃcient. Also any Nash
equilibrium of the multibidding mechanism is also a strong Nash equilibrium. For its
appealing properties under complete information, its simplicity and feasibility in a wide
range of problems, I propose the use of the multibidding mechanism under uncertainty,
i.e. incomplete information.
In this paper, I study how the multibidding mechanism performs when agents hold
private information and are uninformed about others’ preferences. I consider ex ante
identical risk neutral players and a continuum of possible private valuations; i.e. the
continuous case, and study the theoretical properties of the multibidding mechanism with
two alternatives. By its deﬁnition, the mechanism is safe both to run and to participate,
because it is budget-balanced and individually rational once supposed that agents can not
escape from the eﬀects of the chosen public project.
In the multibidding game, bids must sum up to zero for every participant. This fea-
ture aims at extracting individual private information on the relative valuations between
the projects. The mechanism succeeds in it, as at the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria
participants’ bids depend on the diﬀerence between private valuations for the alternatives.
The equilibrium bidding function is strictly increasing and continuous. Its curvature is
determined by the underlying uncertainty that also involves the number of agents.
I show that under uncertainty the multibidding mechanism is always eﬃcient in the
two-player, two-project case if the prior distributions are symmetric or players are antag-
onistically asymmetric.1 Eﬃciency is tied to additional conditions when there are more
players. The number of agents must be large or with a similar intuition behind uncertainty
must be large with zero expected value, in order to achieve eﬃcient outcomes.
1Symmetry of distibution means symmetry of the density function around zero. Asymmetry of players
refers to situations in which players tend to prefer diﬀerent projects and form prior beliefs in the opposite
way; i.e., player 1 is identical to player 2 with switched project labels.
2The two-player, two-project case has been widely analyzed in the auction literature.
McAfee (1992) studies simple mechanisms, explores their properties under uncertainty,
and presents results for an environment with constant absolute risk aversion. He ﬁnds
that the winner’s bid auction reaches (allocative) eﬃciency in the chosen set-up. As for
the multibidding mechanism, it is important to point out that private valuations are now
attached to projects as well as the object in question. This feature makes the model a
slightly more general even in the two-agent case. Normally, both parties are eager to win
the object and feel bad if it is their opponent who does so. Normalization of payoﬀs can
get us back to the situation studied in the auction literature where players receive zero
pay-oﬀ when not winning the auction. There also exist problems in which the object is bad
and both wish that the other one will get it. These situations can be eﬃciently dealt with
using, for example, a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction with the proper deﬁnition for bids and
winner. However, one might imagine situations in which agents share the same opinion
and, for instance, both wish that agent 1 get the object. Under these circumstances, the
ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction is a feasible mechanism once we generalize it, allowing for
both negative and positive bids. The multibidding mechanism can also be used without
modiﬁcation in this case.
An important part of the environments considered here has been studied in the litera-
ture that deals with the problem of siting noxious facilities. Several sealed-bid mechanisms
have been proposed for the problem. The ﬁrst to suggest the use of an auction in this
situation were Kunreuther and Kleindorfer (1986). They showed that outcomes real-
ized by min-max strategies in a low-bid auction are eﬃcient as long as the non-hosting
participants are indiﬀerent between all outcomes. For the case of two cities, O’Sullivan
(1993) proved that symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria of the modiﬁed low bid game yield
an eﬃcient outcome when private valuations are independently drawn.2 He argues that
min-max strategies deliver problematic equilibria in which beliefs may be inconsistent.
The rationality of participation, however, is conditional on the compensation for the host
city.
Ingberman (1995) analyzed the siting problem with costs depending on the distance
from the noxious site and using a majority vote approach. He concluded that decisions
reached in this manner would be ineﬃcient, as markets would produce an excessive number
of noxious facilities and place them in the wrong sites. Rob (1989) modelled the problem
between a pollution-generating ﬁrm and the residents as a mechanism design approach for
the siting problem. Notice that my model is diﬀerent in that I assume that the planner is
uninterested in revenue-raising. In Rob (1989), binary decision must be made, accept or
2It is a voluntary auction under which the city submitting the low bid hosts the region’s noxious
facility and receives the high bid as compensation.
3reject the construction of a pollution-generating plant, and compensatory payments need
to be determined. The outcomes of the resulting mechanism are sometimes ineﬃcient. In
contrast to the equilibrium outcomes of the multibidding mechanism ineﬃciencies become
rampant when there are many residents aﬀected by pollution and the degree of uncertainty
is large.
Jehiel et al. (1996) analyzed a similar model in which external eﬀects appear as the
value of a project to an agent depends on the identity of who carries it out. Their set-up
includes a seller who wants to sell an object to one of n agents and they characterize
the individually rational and incentive compatible mechanisms that maximize the seller’s
revenue. Revenue maximization is not in my interest in this paper and there are other
important assumptions that I do not make. For example, in Jehiel et al. (1996) agents
not only know their own valuation, but also the externality they impose on other players.
The well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are designed for similar problems,
to choose a public project to carry out, under uncertainty and for them truthtelling is
a dominant strategy. Therefore, these mechanisms result in eﬃcient outcomes, however
they are not budget-balanced. The surplus generated by payments is a loss for the agents.
D’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) proposed a mechanism that works in a public
good set-up under uncertainty with independent types. That mechanism works similarly
to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves schemes, but it substitutes dominant-strategy incentive-
compatibility with Bayesian incentive-compatibility. This helps to overcome budget-
balance problems and still ex post eﬃciency is guaranteed. However, a problem still
exists: voluntary participation or individual rationality cannot be reached with the pro-
posed mechanism in their set-up.3
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the mech-
anism formally and starts studying its theoretical properties with symmetric underlying
distributions modelling uncertainty. The analysis is done separately in diﬀerent sections
for the two-player and n-player case because of the diﬀerences in the techniques and re-
sults. I comment on the consequences of asymmetric distributions in Section 5, and relate
the multibidding game to a special problem that frequently arises in the literature: a
dissolving partnership. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are presented in the appendix.
2 Multibidding game under uncertainty
Consider a set of alternatives P = {1,2} and a set of riskneutral agents N = {1,...,i,...,n}
whose utility depends on the alternative carried out. I shall denote by x
j
i ∈ X ⊂ R the
3A more detailed review on the topic including the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms can be found
in Jackson (2001).
4utility that player i enjoys when project j is the winning project. These values are private
information and will be treated as random draws from some underlying common distribu-
tion with density fxj (x) and cumulative distribution function Fxj (x). Agents are identical
ex ante; i.e., these functions do not vary across agents, but may do so across projects.
I also make the usual assumption of these being common knowledge. The variables x
j
i
are considered as continuous random variables here, though my results apply also in the
discrete case with the proper adaptation of the concepts to the discrete environment.
A mechanism is called ex post eﬃcient if it picks out eﬃcient projects for every possible








all k ∈ P. With this, the social planner’s objective is identiﬁed.
The multibidding mechanism can be formally deﬁned as follows:
In the unique stage of the game, agents simultaneously submit a vector of two real
numbers, one for each available project, that sum up to zero. These numbers are called
bids where B
j
i denotes agent i’s bid for project j.






i is chosen winner. Ties
are broken randomly.
Once chosen, the winning project is carried out and agents enjoy the utility that it
delivers. They also must pay/receive their bids submitted for the winning project and
they are returned the aggregated winning bid in equal shares. For example, if project j










By the rules of the multibidding game B1
i = −B2
i for every i, so bids may be negative,
but the aggregated winning bid B
j
N is always non-negative.
The multibidding game achieves budget balance by construction, because the raised
revenue by bids is entirely given back to participants. The social planner or some central
authority does not need any positive or negative amount of money to operate it, therefore
it is safe.
The other properties of the mechanism are studied assuming that agents behave strate-
gically and form their bids as to maximize their expected payoﬀ based on the information
available to them. Their being ex ante identical, the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria
(SBNE) of the game are considered. Therefore, the bid for a given project j is repre-
sented by Bj (x1
i,x2
i) as a function of the personal characteristics whose form does not
depend on the identity of the player. The expected utility for player i is deﬁned as the
expected value of V
j
i . The bidding function that maximizes players’ expected utility will
be called optimal.
Since submitted bids must add up to zero, agents are forced to report on their relative
preferences between the two projects. The optimal bidding behavior of agents taking
part in the multibidding game satisﬁes an appealing and intuitive property: it depends
5only on the diﬀerence between their private valuations for the two projects. That is, at
equilibrium agents do report truthfully on their relative valuation of the projects.
Lemma 1 In the SBNE of the multibidding game, the optimal bidding function depends
only on the diﬀerence between private valuations for the two projects.
Taking into account the result from Lemma 1, one can reformulate the problem at
hand. For that, some more pieces of notation are needed. Let the diﬀerence between
player i’s private valuations be di with the following deﬁnition: di = x1
i − x2
i. This
new variable is random in general, since it is deﬁned by the diﬀerence between two other
random variables. Abusing notation slightly, denote its density by f (d) and its cumulative
distribution function by F (d). Due to presentational considerations, ﬁrst I study problems
in which f (d) is symmetric to the origin.4 There does not appear any subindex on these
objects, because they are common to every agent and correspond to a central variable.
With the bidding function for project j being Bj (di) for every player i, the payoﬀ



















Player 1’s expected utility, when she happens to value project 1 by x1
1, d1 utility units









































  f (d2)   ...   f (dn)dd2 ...ddn.
For simplicity, I shall write player i’s expected utility as vi [x1
i,di,B (yi)], because x1
i and
di give the individual valuations for both projects and by Lemma 1, given the bidding
function, it is di that determines bids. Also, Lemma 1 combined with the complementarity
of bids makes that a single function B can characterize the bidding behavior. This notation
will be very helpful in the following analysis and for this reason let me reiterate the
meaning of the above symbols. Player 1, exactly as the other (n − 1) players in the game,
considers two possible results of the social decision procedure: either project 1 or project
2 will be carried out. The ﬁrst one delivers x1
1 units of utility to player 1 who must
4This assumption on the symmetry of the distribution is not crucial for any of my results, but makes
explanations simpler. I comment on the consequencies of asymmetry in a separate section.








. Note that B1 (y1) can perfectly be a negative number,
nevertheless I shall use the term pay when referring to monetary transactions according
to bids. The expression for the expected utility involves (n − 1) integrals, because every
agent is faced with the uncertainty captured by (n − 1) random variables, the diﬀerences
between others’ private valuations. The second term is to be interpreted in a similar way.
The characterization of the optimal bidding function can be enriched by some general
results on its smoothness and increasing nature. The proof behind these intuitive facts
uses standard arguments to be found, for example, in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), but
adapted to the multibidding game.
Lemma 2 In the SBNE of the multibidding game, the optimal bidding function is con-
tinuous and strictly increasing.
Thanks to the assumption on the symmetry of the underlying distribution, the optimal
bidding function is also symmetric as it is shown in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 In the SBNE of the multibidding game, the optimal bidding function satisﬁes
the following symmetry property: Bj (−di) = −Bj (di) for every j and di.
This result has a key role in deriving ex post eﬃcient outcomes. It simpliﬁes proofs
and helps to compare the multibidding game to other mechanisms in the literature. Its
impact is studied carefully in the next sections.
Taking into account the situations in the above examples, it seems natural to suppose
that agents might abstain from participating in the bidding (decision making), but can
not escape from the externalities, if such external eﬀects exist. For example, villages and
towns aﬀected by the public project may wish not to exert inﬂuence on the choice of the
project, but are still aﬀected by both the positive and the negative consequences of the
others’ decision. The multibidding mechanism, however, has another appealing property
which assures that agents cannot do better by staying out of the decision making process.
Proposition 1 The multibidding mechanism is individually rational.
The intuition behind the above result is that non-participation, as for bids and the
collective choice of the project to be carried out, is equivalent to bidding zero. This bid,
of course, will not, in general, be optimal. Moreover, the abstaining agent looses her part
from the aggregated bid that is always non-negative in this mechanism.
Now, I start analyzing the eﬃciency properties of the multibidding mechanism with
private information. For two players, one can compute the explicit form of the optimal
7bidding function in the multibidding mechanism; in the present set-up, it is always ef-
ﬁcient. If there are more than two players in the game, eﬃciency is not guaranteed in
general. However, the problem of ineﬃcient decisions diminishes with a large number of
players or a large degree of uncertainty.
3 The two-player case
Consider the situation in which a casino must be located in one of two cities; suppose
these cities have no precise information concerning how the other values the project. When
cities are asked individually for their preferences, they have incentives to exaggerate, not
to report it truthfully. The multibidding mechanism can help to overcome this problem
in the decision making process. In this example, the following interpretation is given to
the previously deﬁned variables:
• Project i: city i builds the casino.
• The diﬀerences between private valuations di show how city i’s utility changes when
city 1 gets the right to build the casino. Let B (di) denote the optimal bidding
function determining city i’s bid for project 1.
When both x1
1 and x2
2 are positive, and x2
1 = x1
2 = 0, we have the case in which a
desired object has to be allocated between two agents who experience no regret or envy
when loosing. I shall refer to this case as the classical case.5
Now city 1, which experiences x1
1 and d1, and bids according to some function B at
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1 + B (y1) −
1
2
[B (y1) + B (d2)]
 
  f (d2)dd2.
In this situation, the multibidding mechanism generates the ex post eﬃcient outcomes;
i.e., it chooses eﬃcient projects that are socially optimal. In the classical case, it means
that it assigns the object to the player who values it most.
Proposition 2 In its SBNE with two players, the multibidding mechanism is eﬃcient.
5Note that the classical case enters in my setup if x1
1 and x2
2 have the same symmetric distribution,
while x2
1 and x1
2 are degenerate random variables.
8Symmetry of the optimal bidding function, its monotonicity, and the winning project’s
being chosen by the largest aggregated bid deliver this result. Intuitively, it is because
the complemetary bids of the multibidding mechanism that extract information from
participants on their relative private valuations between the projects. Since one of the
two projects must be carried out by assumption, the absolute social impact of the projects
is irrelevant for eﬃciency. Social welfare is maximized taking into account the sum of
individual relative impacts that are revealed truthfully in the equilibrium aggregated
bids.
The multibidding game is secure for participants too, because they can guarantee for
themselves a minimum payoﬀ by bidding the half of the diﬀerence between their private
valuations for the two projects. Since the aggregate bid for the winning project is always
non-negative, the utility level that players enjoy ex post is never less than the personal
average of private valuations. The bidding function represented by a line with slope 1
2
corresponds to these maximin strategies.
Eﬃciency, budget balance, and individual rationality are appealing properties, but one
also might be interested in the explicit form of the optimal bidding function. This could be
used in empirical work when one recovers private valuations from data on observed bids.
Denote by dM the median diﬀerence, deﬁned by the diﬀerence that solves the following
equality F (dM) = 1
2.6
Proposition 3 In the SBNE of the multibidding game with two players, the optimal
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2 dt if di < dM
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2 if di = dM
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When considering SBNE, Proposition 3 shows that the above described maximin bid-
ding behavior is only optimal at the median diﬀerence di. For di’s above the median it
is optimal to bid less aggressively, because bidding truthfully according to the optimal
bidding function balances the probability of the preferred project to win and the utility
loss due to paying bids. This maximizes agent i’s expected utility, because with di in-
creasing above the median level, the population that agent i should outbid in order to
achieve a favorable outcome for herself is getting smaller. The intuition for values below
the median is very similar and it also follows from the symmetry property of the optimal
bidding function.
6Since the distribution of di is symmetric here, the median coincides with the expected value. But
this is not the case in general as I discuss in Section 5.
9Before deriving result for the general n-player case, I consider some numerical exam-
ples which involve computing and plotting the optimal bidding function for two concrete
distributions, the uniform and the normal. The uniform and the normal distributions,
apart from their practical importance, play a crucial role in the general case.
Example 1 The uniform distribution: agents attach the same likelihood to each value
in the interval from which the diﬀerences between private valuations are drawn. When
diﬀerences are distributed uniformly, di ∼ U [a;b], the mathematical form of the optimal
bidding function can be simpliﬁed to B (di) = 1
3di + a+b
12 for di ∈ [a;b]. Note that the
function is linear. This feature is a property of the uniform distribution, because when
player i increases her bid from B (di) with one unit she outbids the same number of players
independently on the original bid, B (di). When the uniform distribution is symmetric
abound 0, the optimal bidding function is proportional, and does not depend on the limits
of the interval of possible diﬀerences. The slope is 1
3 of the experienced diﬀerence. Graph 1
plots the optimal bidding function in the U [−1;1] case. For reference the picture contains
the 1
2di maximin line.













Optimal bidding function 
 
(Graph 1. Optimal bidding function with uniform distribution and maximin strategies.)
Example 2 The normal distribution. In this example I consider the standard normal
distribution and another having mean zero and variance four. The optimal bidding func-
tions cannot be put in a simple explicit form as in the previous example. Therefore, I
represent them graphically. Graph 2 also contains the 1
2di maximin line for reference. As
one can observe in both cases, the optimal bidding function equals zero when the diﬀerence
between private valuations is zero, its slope increases and it gets closer to linear as the
10variance (uncertainty) increases.







Optimal bidding function; var=4 
Optimal bidding function; var=1 
median/mean 
(Graph 2. Optimal bidding function with normal distributions and maximin strategies.)
4 Large groups
The construction of a casino may aﬀect the welfare of a whole community formed by many
agents. Therefore, it is important to explore the properties of the multibidding game in
the presence of groups with cardinality larger than two. It turns out that whenever there
are more then two participants in the bidding the characteristics of the SBNE of the
mechanism related to eﬃciency change.
Lemma 4 In its SBNE with n > 2, the multibidding mechanism is ex post eﬃcient if
and only if the optimal bidding function is proportional, i.e. B (di) = β   di with some
parameter β > 0 for all i ∈ N.
Eﬃciency of the multibidding mechanism cannot be guaranteed, in general, for any
number of players. In the case of large groups, the eﬃciency requirement puts an impor-
tant restriction on the admissible bidding function in equilibrium: it must be proportional
to di.
Even if proportional functions are intuitive and easy to analyze, it turns out that they
are suboptimal, in general. The reason behind this ﬁnding can be described as follows.
Participants in the n-player case are face an aggregate of bids that can be considered as
the bid of an imaginary player with a diﬀerence between her private valuations deﬁned by
D =
 
j∈N\{i} di. Knowing f (di) the distribution of this aggregate can be characterized,
being the sum of (n − 1) independent and identically-distributed random variables whose
density I shall denote by fD (D). With a proportional bidding function this imaginary
11player bids β  D for project 1. For example, if each di is drawn from the normal distribu-
tion, then D will be distributed normally, too. And we have seen in the previous section
that in that case the optimal bidding function is not proportional, not even linear.
Nevertheless, when n gets large, the distribution of D can be characterized by a very
ﬂat density function, since the variances of di add up. This distribution can also be
considered as very close to a uniform. When this distribution can be approximated by
a uniform distribution that is symmetric around zero, the multibidding mechanism can
approximate ex post eﬃciency. Therefore, a proportional bidding function is not a bad
choice whenever the number of participants is large enough. Proposition 4 and its proof
make the above argument more rigorous.
Proposition 4 In the SBNE of the multibidding game, when n is large, the optimal
bidding function is close to a proportional function with slope n
4n−2.
Graphs 3 delivers the graphical argument behind Proposition 4. It plots the optimal
bidding function for the case with two players when the distribution of diﬀerences is
normal with a large variance (100).7 For reference it also contains the 1
2di line and the
optimal bidding function computed with a standard normal distribution. One can observe
that with the increase of the variance the bidding function in equilibrium gets close to
linear, in particular to a proportional function with slope 1
3.







optimal biding function; var=100 
Optimal bidding function; var=1 
median/mean 
(Graph 3. Optimal bidding function with normal distribution and maximin strategies.)
The intuition behind the result can be described in the following way: as the number of
participants gets larger each agent faces higher uncertainty, because the sum of everybody
else’s bid, D, can obtain values from a larger set. In statistical terms, the variance of D
7The normal distribution is considered here, because by the central limit theorem the distribution of
D gets close to normal with growing variance as n increases.
12is getting larger. Instead of computing the exact distribution of D, agents might ﬁnd
satisfactory to approximate it by a uniform distribution. In the proof of Proposition 4
I show that the error of this approximation can be as small as one may require if the
number of agents can grow arbitrary large. Proposition 5 gives the rate of convergence by
showing the order of the approximation error under the condition that f has uniformly
bounded third moments.
Proposition 5 The error in the approximation (around zero) of the density of a sum
of centered, independent and identically-distributed random variables that has uniformly
bounded third moments, with a constant is of order n−1
2.
In the case of a uniform distribution that is symmetric around zero the optimal bidding
function is proportional. Once Proposition 4 and Lemma 4 are combined, it is shown
that the multibidding mechanism recovers eﬃciency if the number of aﬀected parties (i.e.
participants) is large. On the eﬃciency properties of the mechanism, I state the following
two propositions.
Proposition 6 In its SBNE, when n is large, the multibidding mechanism is close to
eﬃcient.
Proposition 7 oﬀers a result similar to the ones in Proposition 4 and Proposition 6
without the condition on n, the number of participants, being large, but with individual
uncertainty of a very high degree. Technically speaking this means that the variance of
the di is large. Therefore, the variance of the aggregate D is also very large. With this
the multibidding mechanism can approximate eﬃciency also in cases with a small number
of players that face big uncertainty.
Proposition 7 In its SBNE, when uncertainty is large, the multibidding mechanism is
close to eﬃcient.
A few comments on two practical features of the n-player model are now in order. The
eﬃciency of the mechanism is obtained only in the limit, but in empirical situations one
hardly ﬁnds an inﬁnite number of participants. The following three points give support
for the possible existence of eﬃcient outcomes and suggest a method that agents might
use in order to compute their almost optimal bidding function.
• Consider a ﬁnite number of participants. As shown in the proof of Proposition 4, if
the optimal bidding function is linear, i.e. B (di) = β   di, the slope coeﬃcient, β,
should solve the following equality for all di










  FD (−di) − 2di   fD (−di)
= β, (2)
13where the symbol FD ( ) stands for the accumulative distribution function of D.
This is clearly impossible, in general. That is why the multibidding mechanism
only reaches eﬃciency in the limit. Nevertheless, for large n, agents might bid pro-
portionally, since the error they make decreases with n. On the other hand, the
proportional bidding function is easy to apply and analyze.
For simplicity, denote the left-hand side of equation 2 by b(di). Let us denote the
largest and the smallest possible value of di by dmax and dmin respectively.8 Now
agent i can ﬁnd the value for β that minimizes the mean squared error (MSE), de-
ﬁned as MSE =
  dmax
dmin [b(di) − β]
2 f (di)ddi. The minimization problemminβ MSE
such that β > 0 implies that β =
  dmax
dmin b(di)   f (di)ddi = E [b(di)], where E [ ] is
the expected value operator.
• The proof of Proposition 4 shows that the error made by approximating the optimal
bidding function by a proportional one diminishes as the number of participants
grows. For eﬃciency, a large number of participants is needed. However, it is
natural to ask how large is large. Even though I can not deliver an explicit formula
for the optimal bidding function in the general n-player case, simulations have been
performed and their results answer the above question.9 Numerical simulations
of the multibidding game also suggest that eﬃciency increases with the number of
bidders (above two) in a continuos way. For the case in which uncertainty is captured
by the uniform distribution, U [−1;1], Table 1 shows the number of eﬃcient decision
as a function of the number of bidders.
n 2 3 5 10 20
eﬃcient decisions 100% 98.6% 99.1% 99.5% 99.6%
(Table 1. Number of eﬃcient decisions as a function of group size in the U [−1;1] case.)
One can observe that, even in the 3-player case, one with the highest number of
ineﬃcient decisions, approximately 98.6% of the decisions will maximize social wel-
fare. Graph 4 plots the simulated optimal bidding function for the 3-player and
20-player cases in this example. It illustrates how the function looses curvature and
8The limits, dmax and dmin, may very well be inﬁnite.
9The simulation results have been generated using Ox version 2.20 (see Doornik, 1999), and are based
on theoretical results that are presented in a subsection by the end of the appendix.
14gets proportional with the increasing number of participants.
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(Graph 4. Simulated optimal bidding functions for the U [−1;1] case with 3 and 20 players.)
• One can also argue that the interpretation of the above assumptions can be changed
in the following way: agents’ prior beliefs might not coincide with the underlying
true distributions. The results hold, as long as they are symmetric and identical
for every participant in the model. This argument gives more ﬁeld for the eﬃciency
result in the n-player case: when agents expect in a symmetric manner that every
state of the world is equally likely to occur, the distribution of D will be symmetric
and uniform. In this case, agents will bid according to a proportional function in
equilibrium. Therefore, ex post eﬃciency will be achieved.
5 Asymmetries and a dissolving partnership
The literature on mechanism design has discussed extensively the problem of dissolving
partnerships. The problem is a classical one which has admitted eﬃcient solutions under
fairly general conditions. For a broad summary of the performance of simple mechanisms
that one might use in such situations under uncertainty see McAfee (1992). The multi-
bidding mechanism widens this list. The two-player problem serves as a reference point
for further generalization. Moreover, this example will be useful in order to illustrate the
importance of symmetry in prior beliefs. The assumption concerning the symmetry of
the distribution of the diﬀerence between private valuations, di, is now relaxed and its
consequences are studied.10
10Nevertheless, I keep the assumption of symmetry of the support of this distribution. The lack of this
assumption would bring us to the case that is known as asymmetric auctions in the literature. At this
point of the study of the multibidding game I wish to concentrate on other features of the mechanism
and keep this topic for further research.
15When a marriage or, in general, a partnership breaks down there are usually indivis-
ible objects to be allocated among two agents. For technical reasons, the literature on
mechanism design, and closer the literature on auction theory, typically considers a single
object. Using now this nomenclature, two parties and two projects exist: under one party
1 receives the object, while under the other party 2 gets it. I shall assume that players
have private valuations over these projects and the social planner wishes to allocate the
object taking into account social welfare and is not interested in raising revenue.
Let me now consider two parties and an indivisible good that has to be allocated among
them. In this section, we shall use the multibidding mechanism to solve the problem. For
this reason, the following interpretation is given to the variables:
• Project i: player i receives the object.
As for the diﬀerences between private valuations, in the two-player case one can pro-
ceed in two ways to be called the symmetric case and the asymmetric one due to the
diﬀerent meaning of the bidding function in them. I introduce the following piece of
notation: f∗ is a density function such that f (−d) = f∗ (d) for all d. The respective cu-
mulative distribution function is F∗. B∗ (di) denotes the optimal bidding function in the
case of f∗ (d) being the density of the underlying distribution and F∗ (d) its distribution
function. In other words, if B ( ) represents bids for project 1, then B∗ ( ) denotes bids
for its alternative computed in the problem where project names are reversed, and vice
versa.
Lemma 5 In the SBNE of the multibidding game, the optimal bidding function satisﬁes
the following property: B∗ (−di) = −B (di) for every di.
• The asymmetric case arises once one deﬁnes the diﬀerences between private valua-
tions in the following way: d1 = x1
1−x2
1 and d2 = x2
2−x1
2. Hence, di shows how agent
i’s utility changes when she gets the object. Therefore, the optimal bidding func-
tion B (di) can be interpreted as player i’s bid for having the object. I shall assume
that the distributions of these two diﬀerences coincide and can be characterized by
functions f (d) and F (d). However with this, players value the projects in an asym-
metric, in fact opposite, way. The bidding function (1) presented in Proposition 3 is
the optimal bidding function in the asymmetric case for any underlying distribution
characterizing uncertainty. This guarantees ex post eﬃciency in general.
• The symmetric case follows from the model speciﬁcation according to which d1 =
x1
1 − x2
1 and d2 = x1
2 − x2
2. With this, the optimal bidding function B (di) can
be interpreted as player i’s bid for the ﬁrst project in equilibrium. Similarly, in
16the asymmetric case, consider situations in which the distributions of d1 and d2
coincide, and can be characterized by the density function f (d) and the cumulative
distribution function F (d). The name symmetric is due to the latter assumption,
since now players value the projects in the same manner, according to the same
underlying distribution that does not need to be symmetric. The symmetry of prior
belief on di is crucial for ex post eﬃciency in this case. If prior beliefs follow an
asymmetric distribution, then ineﬃcient decisions may occur in the symmetric case.
Proposition 8 and 9 analyze this problem.
In the symmetric case, players tend to prefer the same project and seem not to be as
antagonistically opposed as in the asymmetric case. This situation may arise, for example,
when the two aﬀected parties share the same opinion on the allocation of the indivisible
object in question. That is, they tend to value the projects in the same way, according to
the same underlying distribution. Based on Lemma 3 it is easy to derive the explicit form
of the optimal bidding function, and I can state the symmetric version of Proposition 3.
Proposition 8 In the SBNE of the multibidding game with two players, the optimal











d1 [1 − 2F∗ (t)]
2 dt if d1 < d∗
M
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Remember that by deﬁnition F∗ (d∗
M) = 1
2. Note that the distinction between the
symmetric and the asymmetric cases becomes superﬂuous whenever the underlying dis-
tribution of diﬀerences in valuations is symmetric. This intuitive fact makes that the
bidding functions presented in Graphs 1-3 are optimal both in the symmetric and asym-
metric set-up.
The result on the optimal bidding function in the multibidding game shares some in-
teresting features with the cake-cutting mechanism (CCM) studied in McAfee (1992).11
In the CCM, players bid their true valuations at the median. In the multibidding game,
at the median players bid half of the diﬀerence between their valuations. This not being
the whole truth can be intuitively explained by the rules of the multibidding mechanism,
because players are forced to bid over two projects and bids must sum up to zero. Be-
low the median value, players overbid in the sense that B (di) is larger than the half of
the diﬀerence between the private valuations. While above the median they underbid.
11In the cake-cutting mechanism, one party proposes a division and the other party chooses one of the
parts of the division. This mechanism can be adapted to the indivisible case when money is available in
the economy. For more details check McAfee (1992).
17Nevertheless, there is an important diﬀerence between the CCM and the multibidding
mechanism: the latter treats players symmetrically and precisely because ex post eﬃ-
ciency can be achieved. The CCM, distinguishing the roles of proposer and chooser, turns
out to be "ex post ineﬃcient, and in an unusual way" [McAfee (1992)].
In the (symmetric) case, when players bid for the same project according to the same
bidding function, this may cause the loss of ex-post social eﬃciency. As shown previously,
this problem is absent when players bid for opposite projects using the same bidding
function. The next proposition states that for ex-post eﬃciency, in the symmetric case,
a certain condition on the symmetry of the optimal bidding function must hold. This
condition requires the symmetry of the distribution of the prior beliefs.
Proposition 9 In its SBNE with two players, the multibidding mechanism is eﬃcient if
and only if the prior distribution is symmetric, that is if and only if the following condition
holds: B (−di) = −B (di) for every di and every i.
Section 4 showed that in situations with more than two players the multibidding
game can only deliver ex post eﬃcient decisions if players bid according to a proportional
function in equilibrium. Once the original assumption of symmetry of the underlying
density function is relaxed, an extra condition is needed to ensure proportionality in the
n-player case. The increasing number of bidders increases uncertainty and makes the
optimal bidding function ﬂatter, closer to linear in the model. With this, the number of
ex post eﬃcient decisions also increases. However a constant term in the bidding function
works against this improvement and makes ineﬃcient decisions persist even with very
large number of players. As shown in the proofs of the propositions for the n-player case,
the expected value of the aggregate D must be zero for results to hold. This condition is
satisﬁed when the distribution of d is symmetric; i.e., when agents value the two project
equal in expected terms, since this implies that the expected value of d and also D is zero.
6 Conclusions
I have examined the problem of choosing a project eﬃciently by a group of agents, and
studied the theoretical performance of the multibidding mechanism in situations in which
agents may hold private information. My analysis is embedded in a general model with
any number, n, of players and any number, m, of projects. Therefore, in the present
work, I determined the properties of equilibria in the case of two available projects and
risk-neutral players. The complexity arising when more than two projects or risk-aversion
appears because of the rules of the multibidding game, expected utilities depend on more
than one variable. When two projects exist, agents’ expected utility depends on the two
18private valuations, too, but the dimension of the problem can be reduced by one. As has
been shown, it is enough to know the diﬀerence between those private valuations in order
to be able to determine the optimal bidding behavior. The multibidding mechanism is
always eﬃcient in the two-player two-project case with the above restriction, and with the
symmetry of prior distributions or asymmetry of players, while eﬃciency is tied to more
conditions when there are more players: the number of agents must be large or (with
a similar intuition behind) uncertainty must be large with zero expected value, in order
to achieve eﬃcient outcomes. Because of presentational considerations, a continuum of
possible valuations has been used, but the results, with the proper modiﬁcation, hold in
the discrete case too.
It is important to bear in mind that in the analysis attention was focused on symmetric
Bayes-Nash equilibria; i.e. agents face the same uncertainty and act according to the same
optimal bidding function. The appealing features of the multibidding mechanism without
uncertainty, and under uncertainty with two projects and risk neutral agents, make it a
powerful tool for choosing an eﬃcient project by some set of players in the presence of a
public good and/or externalities. The mechanism is simple and can be easily understood
by agents even in the most general n×m case. Determining the properties of its equilibria
in the general case is a topic for further research.
Beside its theoretical performance, both with and without uncertainty, the multibid-
ding game has also appealing empirical properties. Pérez-Castrillo and Veszteg (2004)
report results from the experimental laboratory on the mechanism presented here. In
terms of eﬃciency, the multibidding game selects the ex post eﬃcient project in roughly
three quarters of the cases across four experimental treatments. In line with the theoreti-
cal predictions, the number of eﬃcient decisions was larger when individuals were paired
than when they formed groups of larger size. Also, the largest part of the subject pool
formed their bids according to the theoretical Bayes-Nash bidding behavior.
7 Appendix
The appendix contains the formal proof of all the results in the paper in the order as they
appear in the text.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the following notation: agent 1 experiences (x1
1,x2
1)
and bids for project 1 according to some function B1 = −B2 at (y1
1,y2











3,...)] and bid truthfully using
the same function B1. The distribution of the vector x
j
−1 can be characterized by the
density fj which is the joint density of the others’ valuations for project j. The expected








































































































































Now consider the case in which agent 1’s private values are (x1
1 + δ,x2
1 + δ) where δ has a










































































































































































Taking into account the ﬁrst and the last expression in the equality above (3) follows
immediately.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let us prove ﬁrst that the optimal bidding function is increas-
ing.
Note that for project 1 to be the winning project I must have a non-negative aggregated
bid for project 1; i.e., B (y1) +
 
i∈N\{1} B (di) ≥ 0. Player 1’s expected utility can be
















































 f (d2)   ...   f (dn)dd2 ...ddn.
Since B is the optimal bidding function, for any d1 and d∗
1 such that d1 > d∗





































































For the sake of this proof let us normalize player 1’s private valuation such that d1 = x1
1,
(0 = x2
1) and d2 = x2
2, (0 = x1
2). This will not eﬀect the generality of my results since
this normalization can be done by adding/subtracting the same constant from both sides





















1)   f (d2)   ...   f (dn)dd2 ...ddn
For this inequality to hold I must have B (d1) ≥ B (d∗
1) and this completes the ﬁrst part
of the proof.
Strict monotonicity and continuity can be proven using a standard indirect argument
following Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). I only explain the idea of the proof here.
Strict monotonicity: suppose that there is an atom at b in the bidding function, that
is pr[B (dj) = b] > 0 for some agent j. In this case agent i would assign probability 0 to
the interval [b − ε;b) for some ε > 0, and she bids just above b. But then agent j with
a diﬀerence dj such that B (dj) = b, would be better oﬀ bidding b − ε, as this does not
reduce the probability of winning, but does reduce cost. Therefore there cannot be an
atom at b.
21Continuity: if B is discontinuous I can ﬁndb′ and b′′(> b′) such that pr{B (dj) ∈ [b′;b′′]} =
0, while there exist d∗





= b′′ + ε. In this case, agent i strictly
prefers bidding b′ to any other bid in (b′;b′′), since doing so does not reduce the probabil-
ity of winning, but does reduce cost. But then agent j’s choice of quitting at b′′, or just
beyond, is not optimal when she experiences d∗
j. Therefore B is continuous.
Proof of Lemma 3. I shall omit the superindex from the optimal bidding function
in the proof, since B1 (di) = −B2 (di) holds for every di. Suppose that agent i experiences
private valuations with a diﬀerence of di = x1
i −x2
i. Her bid for project 1 in the equilibrium
can be computed according to the optimal bidding function and will be equal to B (di).
Due to the rules of the multibidding mechanism, in particular to the fact that bids must
sum up to zero, with this her bid for project 2 is −B (di). Now I can consider situations
in which for player 1 it is more convenient to compute her bid for project 2 ﬁrst, i.e. to
take into account d∗
i = x2
i − x1
i = −di. Of course, equilibrium bids can not change with
the above technicality, therefore B∗ (−di) = B∗ (d∗
i) = −B (di). Since by symmetry the
density functions of di and d∗
i coincide, we have for bidding functions that B = B∗. That
is B (−di) = −B (di).
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider agent i’s expected payoﬀ when her type is
di. If she bids according to the optimal bidding function this quantity is equal to
vi [x1
i,di,B (di)]. When agent i does not wish to inﬂuence the choice of the winning
project she can bid 0, and with it obtain vi (x1
i,di,0) in expected terms. For any di by
deﬁnition I have that vi [x1
i,di,B (di)] ≥ vi (x1
i,di,0). With zero bid agent i does not
aﬀect the choice of the winning project, but does receive her part from the aggregated
winning bid that is non-negative by the rules of the multibidding mechanism. If va
i (x1
i,di)
is agent i’s expected utility when she stays out of the process, then for any di I must have
vi [x1
i,di,B (di)] ≥ va
i (x1
i,di). That is the multibidding mechanism is individually rational.
Proof of Proposition 2. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the optimal
bidding function is strictly increasing. To see this, consider the following table that
describes a two-player situation in general with the notation introduced in the text before.


























2 ≥ 0, or d1 + d2 ≥ 0. The above requirement is met since the
optimal bidding function is strictly increasing and symmetric: d1 + d2 ≥ 0 ↔ d1 ≥ −d2
↔ B (d1) ≥ B (−d2) ↔ B (d1) ≥ −B (d2) ↔ B (d1) + B (d2) ≥ 0 ↔ Project 1 wins.
22Proof of Proposition 3. By result from Lemma 2 project 1 wins if B (d1) ≥
B (−d2), that is d1 ≥ −d2. Therefore project 1 wins with probability pr(d1 ≥ −d2) =
pr(−d1 ≤ d2) = 1 − F (−d1). Due to the assumption on the symmetry of the underlying
density function the density of d2 and −d2 coincide. Now let us ﬁnd the expected utility
for player 1 that experiences d1 (= x1
1 − x2














1 − B (y1) +
1
2









1 + B (y1) −
1
2
[B (y1) + B (d2)]
 
f (−d2)d(−d2).





































In order to simplify the above expression let us use the following notation: d∗
2 = −d2.This
will also help to interpret the proof in the case when I relax the assumption on the

















































Agents are supposed to maximize their expected utility in the bidding. The ﬁrst order















































































′ (y1) − 2B (y1)f (y1) + d1f (y1) = 0







′ (d1) − 2B (d1)f (d1) + d1f (d1) = 0 (6)
23If F (d1) = 1
2 then B (d1) =
d1
2 . If F (d1)  = 1
2 we have that
B
′ (d1) − 2
f (d1)
1
2 − F (d1)
B (d1) + d1
f (d1)
1
2 − F (d1)
= 0.
Let us introduce the notation A(d1) =
f(d1)
1
2−F(d1) and x ∈ [xL,xH]. The latter identiﬁes the
lowest and the largest admissible value for x. The diﬀerential equation and its general
solution can be written now as
B
′ (d1) − 2A(d1)B (d1) + d1A(d1) = 0,























Note that the integrals in the solution might include a diﬀerence such that A(d1) is not
deﬁned, therefore x must be carefully chosen. This parameter along with η can be ﬁxed
taking into account that the optimal bidding function must be continuous and strictly
increasing.








2 [1 − 2F (d1)]
−2  
  dM
d1 [1 − 2F (t)]
2 dt if d1 < dM
d1
2 if d1 = dM
1
2d1 − 1
2 [1 − 2F (d1)]
−2  
  d1
dM [1 − 2F (t)]





To do so note that the following holds. For d1 > dM ﬁx some x > dM and choose η such















[1 − 2F (t)]
2 dt
 




dM [1 − 2F (t)]
2 dt. It exists, it is ﬁnite, it does not depend on d1 and
guarantees the properties that I require from B (d1). In particular, the optimal bidding
function needs to be continuous, therefore the above proposed value for η is unique. To
see this note that according to (7) discontinuity may occur at the median, and also that η
is a constant shifting parameter that allows us to move the optimal bidding function for
all d1 < dM in order to reach continuity at dM. For d1 < dM ﬁx some x < dM and choose















[1 − 2F (t)]
2 dt
 




xL [1 − 2F (t)]
2 dt. It exists, it is ﬁnite, it does not depend on d1
and guarantees the properties that I require from B (d1). As in below the median, the
24proposed value for η is unique here, too. These parameter values give the expression in
equation 7 that completes the proof. Note that equation 6 and the monotonicity of the
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This result will be useful in the case with large groups.
Proof of Lemma 4. For ex post eﬃciency I need the aggregated optimal bid
function to be a increasing strictly monotone function of the aggregated true valuations.
If the optimal bid function is proportional, B (di) = βdi, this is the case, since
 
i∈N B (di) = β
 
i∈N di holds. I already know that β > 0, since the optimal bidding
function is strictly increasing.
In order to show the other implication consider the following. Suppose that I have
 
i∈N B (di) = B for some vector d with
 
i∈N di = A where A and B are some real
numbers. Now let the valuation change for some players i1 and i2 such that d∗
i1 = di1 +∆,
while d∗
i2 = di2 − ∆. Therefore
 
i∈N d∗
i = A. For the result to be ex post eﬃcient I need
the aggregated bid to remain unchanged. To see this consider the following inequalities










































































B (di) = 0,






B (di) = 0,
B (di1 + ∆) − B (di1) + B (di2 − ∆) − B (di2) = 0,
B (di1 + ∆) − B (di1)
∆
=
B (di2) − B (di2 − ∆)
∆
,
for di1 and di2, and all ∆. I can consider ∆ → 0. The above requirement then says that
B′ (di1) = B′ (di2) for di1 and di2. Precisely this means that the optimal bidding function
must be linear. Now let us argument that the constant term in this linear function must be
25equal to zero. If the mechanism is ex post eﬃcient then
 
i∈N B (di) = nα+β
 
i∈N di ≥ 0
iﬀ
 
i∈N di ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider Player 1’s expected utility with B (di) = βdi.
Since Project 1 is chosen if
 










































  fD (D)dD,
where fD (D) is the density function of the aggregate D. Note that D ∈ [Dmin;Dmax] with



















































































  fD (−y1).
































  fD (−d1) = 0.













  FD (−d1) − 2d1   fD (−d1)
 
+ d1   fD (−d1) = 0.
This expression, in general for any FD and fD, cannot be set to be equal to zero for all
values of d1 by choosing a constant value for β. I already know that the optimal bid-
ding function is strictly increasing which can be translated into a strictly positive β in
the proportional case. Nevertheless, if the functions FD and fD belonged to the uniform
distribution over some interval [−a;a] I would have β = n
4n−2. In other words, if the
distribution of D is uniform with expected value zero, the optimal bidding function is
proportional, hence ex post eﬃciency is achieved. This requirement is met in the special
case of symmetric distributions. The interval, [−a;a], is symmetric to zero by assumption,
26since D must have expected value zero. Since D is the sum of iid random variables as
n gets very large it converges to a normally distributed variable whose expected value is
zero and whose variance tends to inﬁnity. Now let us argue that, when n is large, agents
do not make a big mistake if taking into account the uniform distribution instead of the
normal.
In order to keep expressions simple I consider the normal distribution with variance n.
If there are n agents the distribution of the sum of the diﬀerences of their private valua-
tions will typically have a variance of (n − 1)σ2. This simpliﬁcation does not aﬀect the















































where Φn denotes the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution with
zero mean and variance equal to n. As the parameters a and n increase the squared error
decreases towards zero. That is, for any ε > 0 one can ﬁnd δ > 0 such that with any
a,n > δ I have SQE (a,n) < ε.
Proof of Proposition 5. For simplicity let us consider agent 1 as playing against
other n agents in the economy. If di ∼ iiF with expected value 0 and variance σ2, once we




j → N (0;nσ2)
in the sense of distribution. Moreover Berry (1941) shows that the error term of this
approximation in the neighborhood of zero is of order n−1
2. Now let us consider the error
in the approximation of the normal density with a constant. I study the following tolerance
measure for the goodness of the approximation; i.e., the ﬁrst order Taylor approximation
of the normal density around 0:
Tol = max
d1∈[dmin;dmax]



















Similarly to the two-player case, as shown in Proposition 3, individual bids are bounded
also in the n-player case, both from above and below. Take d∗ = max{|dmin|,|dmax|}. The
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−1 < 0 holds always in our examples. For this reason




































As for the rate of convergence, note that we have that limn→∞
√
nTol(n;σ2) = 0. Hence





. Altogether, in two steps, it has been shown
that the error term in the approximation around zero of the density of a sum of centered
iid random variables, that have uniformly bounded third moments, with a constant is of
order n−1
2.
Proof of Proposition 6. This result follows immediately from Lemma 4 and
Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 7. The result in Proposition 4 relies on the fact that the
variance of D can be any large whenever the number of participants is large enough.
Naturally the large variance of D can be due to the large variance of every single di, too.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose that agent i experiences private valuations with a
diﬀerence of d1 = x1
1 − x2
1. Her bid for project 1 in the equilibrium can be computed
according to the optimal bidding function and will be equal to B (d1). Due to the rules
of the multibidding mechanism, in particular to the fact that bids must sum up to zero,
with this her bid for project 2 is −B (d1). Now I can consider situations in which for




1 = −d1. Of course, equilibrium bids can not change with the above
technicality, therefore B∗ (−d1) = B∗ (d∗
1) = −B (d1). Since the support of f and f∗
coincides both bidding functions, B and B∗ are well-deﬁned.
Proof of Proposition 8. Proposition 8 follows from Proposition 3 and Lemma 3.





































In the next steps I shall transform the above expression in order to get (5) that will allow
us to use the solution from Proposition 3. Now let us introduce the following change in
the variables: −d∗
2 = d2. Note that since the support of f and f∗ is the same I have that
28xL = x∗































































































If B ( ) represents player 1’s bid (bidding function) for project 1 in equilibrium, B∗ ( ) in
the above expression can be interpreted as player 2’s bid for the alternative project 2.
The variables these functions depend on once again have the same distribution, i.e. I am
back in the asymmetric case. Proposition 8 can be derived from (8) applying the solution
from Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 9. From Proposition 3 and Proposition 8 we have that the
optimal bidding function is symmetric, B (−di) = −B (di) for every di and every i, if and
only if the prior distribution is symmetric around 0. Let me show ﬁrst that symmetry




2 → d1 ≥ −d2. By strict
monotonicity of the bidding function B (d1) ≥ B (−d2), that implies ex-post eﬃciency if
the symmetry condition holds:
B (d1) ≥ −B (d2) → B (d1) + B (d2) ≥ 0.
For the reverse implication note ﬁrst that by eﬃciency
d1 + d2 = 0 ↔ B (d1) + B (d2) = 0,
−d1 + d1 = 0 ↔ B (−d1) + B (d1) = 0,
that gives the symmetry condition of B (−d1) = −B (d1).
7.1 Simulation
This subsection contains theoretical results that have been used in the simulation process
for the uniform, U [−1;1], example with more than two bidders. Final results of the
simulation are resumed in Table 1. in the main text. In order to analyze the general
n-player as a special case with only two players, e.g. player 1 and the rest of the agents,
the following pieces of notations are introduced: D−1 = B−1 [
 n
i=2 B (di)].
The distributions of the random variables in question are di ∼ iiFd and B (di) ∼
iiFB(d), and by the central limit theorem
 n
i=2 B (di)
a ∼ N ( ;σ2). Now I can state a
symmetry result on the optimal bidding function in the general n-player case.
29Lemma 6 If n is large, the distribution of D−1 is symmetric if and only if B is symmetric;
i.e., B (−di) = −B (di) for every di.




B (di) ∼ FΣ,fΣ;




B (di) ≤ B (x)
 







= fΣ [B (x)]   B
′ (x).
Now let me consider the ﬁrst implication in the proposition with the following equali-
ties: fD (−x) = fΣ [B (−x)]   B′ (−x). If the optimal bidding function B is symmetric we
also have that fΣ [−B (x)]   B′ (x) = fΣ [B (x)]   B′ (x) = fD (x). That is the underlying
distribution is symmetric.
In order to prove the proposition in the opposite direction, suppose that the distribu-
tion characterized by FD is symmetric. Now one has that
FD (−x) = 1 − FD (x);
FΣ [B (−x)] = 1 − FΣ [B (x)];
B (−x) = −B (x).
That is the optimal bidding function B is symmetric.
Even if I can not compute the optimal bidding function in the general case, I can
deliver a mathematical expression for its explicit form that is useful in the simulation.











d1 [1 − 2F (t)]
n
n−1 dt if d1 < dM
d1
2 if d1 = dM
1
2d1 − 1




dM [2F (t) − 1]
n




where F is the cumulative distribution function of D−1 = B−1 [
 n
i=2 B (di)].
Proof. Let me deﬁne D−1 = B−1 [
 n
i=2 B (di)] ∼ F,f. Now project 1 wins if B (d1)+
 n
i=2 B (di) ≥ 0, that is when B−1 [−B (d1)] ≤ D−1. Since the distribution of D−1 is
symmetric by the previous lemma we have that the optimal bidding function is also














1 − B (y1) +
1
n









1 + B (y1) −
1
n
[B (y1) + B (D−1)]
 
f (D−1)dD−1.
Agents are supposed to maximize their expected utility in the bidding. The ﬁrst order
condition of the problem is ∂
∂y1v1 [x1
1,d1,B (y1)] = 0 that gives the following results: the















′ (d1) − 2B (d1)f (d1) + d1f (d1) = 0











F (d1) = 0; i.e., F (d1) = 1
2 then B (d1) = d1
2 .
If F (d1)  = 1
2 then
B





























n)F(d1) and x ∈ [xL,xH]. The latter
identiﬁes the lowest and the largest admissible value for x. The diﬀerential equation and
its general solution can be written now as
B
′ (d1) − 2A(d1)B (d1) + d1A(d1) = 0,























Note that the integrals in the solution might include a diﬀerence such that A(d1) is not
deﬁned, therefore x must be carefully chosen. This parameter along with η can be ﬁxed
taking into account that the optimal bidding function must be continuous and strictly
increasing.



















































dM [2F (t) − 1]
n
n−1 dt.











d1 [1 − 2F (t)]
n
n−1 dt if d1 < dM
d1
2 if d1 = dM
1
2d1 − 1




dM [2F (t) − 1]
n





The problem with the above result is that the formula for B (d1) implicitly contains
the inverse of the optimal bidding function, because the distribution function F is deﬁned
in D−1 = B−1 [
 n
i=2 B (di)] ∼ F,f. That is
 n
i=2 B (di)
a ∼ N ( ;σ2) and FD (x) =
FΣ [B (x)]. But we can use these results for simulating the optimal bidding function
and computing a measure for its eﬃciency. The optimal bidding function is determined
according to the following iterative procedure:
1. Take as given
 n
i=2 B (di) ∼ FΣ, possibly some N ( ;σ2), and compute with it
BF1 (d1).
2. Compute F2 (d1) = FΣ [BF1 (d1)].
3. Using the resulting distribution function F2 (d1) from the previous point compute
BF2 (d1).
4. Repeat the procedure 1.-3. until the result converges, that is maxd1
   BFn−1 (d1) − BFn (d1)
    <
ε for some predeﬁned ε > 0.
In the example presented in the paper ε = 10−5 and I have used 501 evaluation points
in the [−1;1] interval in order to plot the optimal bidding function. The number of ex
post eﬃcient decisions has been approximated by a Monte Carlo experiment with 50000
draws. Results are presented in Table 1. in the main text of the paper.
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